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Section 1 
Introduction 
Background to the analysis  
To inform debate over the 2016 Trade Union Act the TUC commissioned UCL/NIESR to 
undertake a three-pronged investigation on the nature of unions and their effects on 
employers and employees. This comprised: 
 a review of existing literature on union effects 
 new analyses of the Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) 
 a more detailed investigation of the links between unionisation and work/life balance. 
This report focuses on the second element, namely the new analyses of WERS. 
The review of existing evidence focused on quantitative research for Britain. The review – 
which is summarised in the Appendix to this report – found that unions still deliver 
observable benefits to the average union member, in terms of higher wages, more 
extensive fringe benefits, higher levels of workplace training and the more effective 
resolution of individual workplace disputes. At the same time, the negative effects on 
employers, once a common feature of empirical studies, have largely dissipated in recent 
years.   
However, some of the evidence is dated and, because different authors make different 
choices when analysing data, it is difficult to form an overall impression of union effects 
based on this evidence. 
We have therefore undertaken new analyses of the 2004 and 2011 Workplace Employment 
Relations Surveys (WERS) to update the evidence on unions' influence on employers and 
employees.  We have chosen a common set of variables to characterise workplace 
unionisation – membership, density, union recognition, the presence of an on-site union 
representative, and a summary union strength scale – and we have sought to isolate the 
independent effect of unions on outcomes of interest using a common set of control 
variables.  This allows the reader to compare union effects over time between 2004 and 
2011, and across different outcomes. 
Our contribution  
Our contribution focuses on the economic impact of union representation within 
workplaces in Britain. We begin by briefly setting out the current state of workplace union 
representation in the UK. We introduce our key measures of unionisation at the individual 
and the workplace level.  We show the change in union incidence between 2004 and 2011 
across the key dimensions of workplace unionisation that enter our subsequent multivariate 
analyses of outcomes for employers and employees. 
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We then go on to present the micro-economic analysis of the impact of unions on a variety 
of outcomes of primary interest to workers, such as pay, before turning to their impact on 
outcomes of primary interest to employers, such as productivity and profitability. We 
introduce our methodology before presenting the results. 
We cannot claim that our results definitively capture the causal effects of unionisation. 
Instead, we present point-in-time comparisons between union and non-union workers (or 
their workplaces), with account taken of the differences between them on other observable 
characteristics. Nevertheless, this is the standard approach adopted in much of the 
literature and, since we also know a great deal about the factors that influence unionisation 
in Britain, we can make reasonable inferences about unions' effects on outcomes such as 
wages and workplace performance. 
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Section 2 
Data and methodology 
The Workplace Employment Relations Surveys 2004  
and 2011 
We analyse linked employer-employee data from the Workplace Employment Relations 
Surveys (WERS) for 2004 and 2011.  Appropriately weighted, both waves of the survey are 
nationally representative surveys of workplaces in Britain with five or more employees, 
covering all sectors of the economy except agriculture and mining (Van Wanrooy et al., 
2013).  
The analysis exploits three elements of the survey.  The first is the management interview, 
conducted face-to-face with the most senior workplace manager responsible for employee 
relations. Interviews for the 2011 survey were conducted in 2,680 workplaces between 
March 2011 and June 2012 with a response rate of 46 per cent.  The 2004 survey conducted 
management interviews in 2,295 workplaces between A and B with a response rate of 64 
per cent. 
The second element is the survey of employees, distributed in workplaces where a 
management interview was obtained.  In 2011 self-completion questionnaires were 
distributed to a simple random sample of 25 employees (or all employees in workplaces 
with 5-24 employees) in the 2,170 workplaces (81 per cent) where management permitted 
it. Of the 40,513 questionnaires distributed, 21,981 (54 per cent) usable ones were returned.  
The 2004 survey had adopted the same procedure, distributing self-completion 
questionnaires in the 86 per cent of workplaces where management permitted it.  Of the 
37,012 questionnaires distributed, 22,451 usable ones (61 per cent) were returned. 
The third element is the survey of worker representatives, carried out in those workplaces 
with on-site employee representation. The survey sought interviews with the most senior 
union representative at the workplace, and also with the most senior non-union 
representative, although we only use the former in our analyses. Among the 1,153 
workplaces with union representatives, 797 generated a productive interview, giving a 
response rate of 69 per cent.  These data are used to derive a measure of union facility time, 
as indicated by the number of hours that senior union representatives devoted to their 
function every week. 
Weights are provided with the survey data to correct for the sample design and any 
observable non-response biases. 
Methodology 
In Section Three we present simple descriptive analyses on the incidence of trade unionism 
in WERS in 2004 and 2011.  Because these and all other analyses presented are based on 
weighted data we can extrapolate from our analyses to the population of all workplaces in 
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Britain with at least five employees, and to employees in those workplaces.  Analyses are 
presented at the employee level and the workplace level. 
We then move onto multivariate analyses of the associations between unionisation and 
outcomes of interest. In all cases we present linear regression estimates weighted by the 
survey sample weights so that results can be extrapolated to the population of workplaces 
with at least 5 employees and the employees who work in those workplaces. 
For all outcomes we run separate analyses for 2004 and 2011, for the whole economy and 
the private sector.  First we present raw correlations between unionisation and the outcome 
of interest.  Then we present regression-adjusted estimates having controlled for a standard 
set of control variables.  Both the workplace and employee-level analyses control for the 
following workplace characteristics: 
 number of employees (6 categories) 
 single-establishment organisation 
 total size of organization (4 categories) 
 single-digit industry (12 categories) 
 age of establishment (6 categories) 
 region (11 categories) 
 largest single-digit non-managerial occupation at the workplaces (8 categories) 
 foreign owned. 
The employee-level analyses also control for the following set of employee-level observable 
features: 
 sex 
 age (seven categories) 
 marital status (five categories) 
 dependent children 
 disability 
 ethnicity 
 highest academic qualification (nine categories) 
 highest vocational qualification (10 categories) 
 single-digit occupation (nine categories) 
 usual hours worked (six categories) 
 workplace tenure (six categories) 
 type of employment contract (four categories) 
 8 
Our union variables are described in the next section.  Outcome variables are discussed 
when we present the results in Sections Four and Five. 
The tables that follow only present the coefficients for the union variables, though full 
models are available from the authors on request.  Only one union variable enters each 
model: each emboldened heading in the left hand column of the tables indicates a separate 
regression.  The statistical significance of any union effect is indicated with asterisks as 
noted in the footnotes to the tables.  Since the models are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
model coefficients can be interpreted as indicating the absolute difference in the 
dependent variable when comparing across categories of the union indicator.   In the 
bottom row of each table is the number of unweighted observations appearing in the 
model. 
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Section 3 
Incidence of unionisation in 2004  
and 2011 
As reported in Section 2 of our literature review (Bryson and Forth, 2016), there has been a 
decline in the incidence of union membership and union recognition in Britain in the last 
few decades. This has taken place in both the private and the public sectors, though the 
public sector remains much more heavily unionised.  The rate of decline has not been 
uniform everywhere, but there are few industries or occupations which have seen growth in 
union presence.  In the last decade or so, the rate of decline has slowed somewhat. This is 
reflected in Table 3.1 which shows the incidence of unionisation, variously defined, in 2004 
and 2011 for the whole economy and for the private sector only. The table has three panels: 
Panel A presents the incidence of unionisation at the workplace level; Panel B presents 
employee-level estimates shows employees' exposure to unionisation; Panel C records the 
unweighted sample sizes used to construct Panels A and B. 
See table 3.1 in appendix B. 
The first row of Panel A shows the percentage of workplaces recognising at least one trade 
union for pay bargaining remained static over the period.  Across the economy just over 
one-fifth (22 per cent) of workplaces recognised a union, compared to only 12-13 per cent 
in the private sector.  Because it tends to be larger workplaces that recognise trade unions, 
employee coverage is higher than workplace coverage: row 1 of Panel B indicates that 
almost half (48-51 per cent) of employees work in a workplace with at least one recognised 
trade union, but this falls to one-third (32-35 per cent) in the private sector. 
In 2004 around three-quarters of workplaces had no union members, but this had risen to 
nearly four-fifths by 2011 (Panel A, row 2).  The percentage of workplaces that were heavily 
unionised (50 per cent+ density) fell from 13 per cent in 2004 to 10 per cent in 2011.  
Individual union membership was roughly stable at a little under one-third of employees in 
the whole economy and one-fifth of those in the private sector (row 2, Panel B).  But the 
proportion of employees in workplaces with substantial union density fell a little. This all 
implies that union members are increasingly concentrated in a smaller set of workplaces. 
Only a small minority of workplaces in Britain have a recognised union with an on-site 
union representative – 7 per cent in the whole economy and 3 per cent in the private sector 
(Panel A, row 3).  Very few workplaces (1 per cent) have a union representative spending at 
least 15 hours per week on union rep work; indeed, workplaces with union reps that spend 
at least five hours a week on their role are rare, particularly in the private sector (Panel A, 
row 4).  However, the time union reps spend on their function rises with workplace size such 
that around one-in-ten employees work in a workplaces with a full-time union 
representative on-site (Panel B, row 5), while 14-15 per cent work in workplaces with a 
union representative spending at least 15 hours per week on representative duties. 
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The final measure of unionisation appearing at the bottom of Table 1 is a count measure of 
union strength ranging from 0 (no union presence) to 6 where workplaces score a point for: 
 having a recognised union 
 having an on-site union lay representative 
 union density of at least 25 per cent 
 union density of at least 50 per cent 
 union density of at least 75 per cent 
 union density of 100 per cent. 
The mean score on this (0,6) summary index fell from 0.72 in 2004 to 0.57 in 2011.  It also 
fell in the private sector, from 0.38 to 0.25.  But it is noteworthy that, even at the 75th 
percentile in the workplace distribution of this variable the union strength score was zero.  
The decline in union strength over time is not quite so apparent at the employee-level, 
suggesting the decline in union strength was more apparent in smaller workplaces.  
Although the median score for union strength among employees was zero, those at the 
75th percentile in the distribution were exposed to unions scoring 3 on the index (2 in the 
private sector). 
The overall picture is one of gently declining unionisation between 2004 and 2011, from an 
already fairly low incidence level, particularly in the private sector. 
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Section 4 
Union effects on employees 
Introduction 
We begin our analysis of union effects by considering outcomes that are primarily of 
interest to workers, that is: 
 pay  
 pay satisfaction 
 pension contributions from the employer 
 off-the-job training 
 satisfaction with training. 
As explained in Section Two we go through each outcome in turn presenting results in 
tables that follow the same format.  We run separate regression estimates by year for the 
private sector then the whole economy.  In each case there are two model specifications.  
The first is simply the raw correlation between the union variable and the outcome of 
interest.  The second model specification controls for the potentially confounding 
observable differences between union and non-union workers using the variables described 
in Section Two and again at the footnote to each table. 
Pay 
Historically, one of the principal benefits for union members in Britain has been the delivery 
of a wage premium over similar non-members through collective bargaining. The union 
wage premium has historically been seen as a measure of union power since, although such 
a premium relies on the availability of economic rents (and is hence to some extent 
dependent on product markets), higher union wages are also predicated on unions having 
sufficient power to force employers to give away a higher share of these rents than they 
would in the absence of unions. 
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See table 4.1 in appendix B.  
Across the whole economy the raw gross hourly wage gap between union members and 
non-members halved between 2004 and 2011 from around 19 per cent to 11 per cent 
(Table 4.1, row 1).  However, the regression-adjusted difference fell only marginally from 8 
per cent to 6.5 per cent.  This is roughly equivalent to the union wage premium Forth and 
Bryson (2015) estimated for union membership in the 2014 QLFS. The raw wage gap 
between members and non-members in the private sector also fell by around one-half but, 
again, the regression-adjusted differential did not change very much, falling from around 
5.3 per cent to 3.8 per cent. 
Row 2 in Table 4.1 shows the gross hourly wage difference between employees in unionised 
and non-unionised workplaces, regardless of their membership status.  Although there is a 
raw union wage differential of about 14-15 per cent in the whole economy in both years, 
the regression adjusted union recognition premium is only statistically significant in 2011, 
rising from a non-significant 2.3 per cent in 2004 to 5.1 per cent in 2011.  A similar story is 
apparent in the private sector. 
Row 3 differentiates between three types of workplace: those with no union members, 
those with union density of less than 50 per cent and those workplaces where a majority of 
employees are union members.  After accounting for other observable differences across 
workplaces, the union wage premium is only statistically significant in workplaces where a 
majority of employees are union members.  This is the case in both years for both the 
whole economy and the private sector. 
Row 4 differentiates between workplaces without union recognition and those with a 
recognised union with and without an on-site union representative.  In the whole economy 
a union wage premium emerges after accounting for observable differences across 
workplaces and it is of the same magnitude, whether or not the union has an on-site 
representative.  However, this is only true in 2011: in 2004 there is no significant union rep 
premium.  In the private sector, the union wage premium in 2011 is around 5 per cent and 
is identical, whether the union has an on-site representative or not. By contrast, in 2004 the 
union premium was only apparent where there was a union representative on-site. 
The final row of Table 4.1 shows the wage returns to union strength, as captured in the (0,6) 
additive scale described earlier.  In both the whole economy and the private sector, a 1 
point increase in the union strength scale equates to about a 1-2 per cent rise in the 
regression-adjusted gross hourly union wage premium in 2004 and 2011. 
Pay satisfaction 
If unions raise employees’ wages one might expect union members to be more satisfied 
with their pay compared to "like" employees who are not unionised.  Recent evidence from 
British panel data for employees through to the Crash in 2008 suggests this was the case 
(Bryson and White, 2013). But this is not unequivocally the case in WERS in either 2004 or 
2011.  In the whole economy, union members appeared less satisfied with their wages than 
their non-member counterparts in 2004, whereas there was no association by 2011.  In the 
private sector the association was not significant in either year (Table 4.2). 
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See table 4.2 in appendix A 
However, there are signs of a positive association between union density and pay 
satisfaction: in the whole economy having majority membership was positively associated 
with pay satisfaction in 2011, but not in 2004.  In the private sector the positive association 
was statistically significant in both years.   
There is no clear association between on-site representation and pay satisfaction 
controlling for observable differences between union and non-union workplaces.  However, 
the composite measure of union strength indicates pay satisfaction rises with union 
strength.  The association is statistically significant in the whole economy only in 2011 
whereas in the private sector it is statistically significant in both years but becomes 
quantitatively more important by 2011. 
Pension benefits 
As part of negotiations over wages and work effort, unions can also affect non-wage 
components of the reward package. In 2011 only, employees were asked whether they 
received contributions from an employer to a pension scheme.  Union members were 17 
per cent more likely to say yes than non-members, but the differential falls to 5 per cent 
having controlled for observable differences between members and non-members in their 
demographic, job and workplace characteristics (Table 4.3, row 1).  The union premium is 
similar in the private sector and is in line with the union wage premium. 
See table 4.3 in appendix B.  
The union pension premium is large and statistically significant for employees in workplaces 
recognising a trade union (row 2).  The effect rises with union density, with the presence of 
an on-site union rep, and with our union strength indicator. 
Off-the-job training 
One might expect a positive association between unionisation and training for a number of 
reasons. In order to offset the cost-increasing impact of any union wage premium, 
employers will want to increase worker productivity via training and skills acquisition. 
Second, if union voice reduces voluntary quits, thus raising worker tenure, this creates an 
additional incentive for firms to invest in their workers’ human capital. Third, members will 
look to unions to assist them in skills acquisition, whether firm-specific or general. Fourth, 
as noted in the literature review, jobs in the union sector have had greater learning 
requirements than those in the non-union sector. 
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See table 4.4 in appendix A. 
Analyses in Table 4.4 are in keeping with recent evidence suggesting a clear positive 
association between employees' receipt of off-the-job training and union coverage. Union 
members are around 3-5 per cent more likely to have received off-the-job training in the 
past 12 months than observationally equivalent non-members, a figure that has remained 
roughly constant over 2004-2011 (row 1). The effects are broadly similar when using union 
recognition to proxy union effects.  However, the effects are confined to workplaces where 
a majority of employees belong to a union (row 3) and where they are identified as strong 
according to our union strength index (row 5). 
See table 4.5 in appendix A. 
Employees in the union sector also appear to have longer durations of off-the-job training 
than their non-union counterparts.  Table 4.5 estimates the probability that an employee 
has received at least five days off-the-job training in the last 12 months.  In the whole 
economy, union members were more likely to receive 5+ days of training in the previous 12 
months than observationally similar non-members in both 2004 and 2011.  However, the 
association appears more dependent on union strength in 2011 than in 2004: indeed the 
union effect is absent for weaker unions in 2004.  In the private sector there are no union 
effects on longer durations of training in 2004 but positive statistically significant 
associations emerge in 2011 where unions are strong and, specifically, when they have 
majority membership at a workplace. 
 
See table 4.6 in appendix B  
The increased amount of off-the-job training received by unionised employees compared 
to similar non-unionised employees does not appear to translate into greater satisfaction 
with training (Table 4.6). Indeed, if anything, the association is a negative one. 
Summary 
In this section we have added to the existing literature on the links between unionisation 
and benefits to employees in the form of wages, pensions and training by running new 
estimates for union effects in 2004 and 2011.  We find unions continue to procure benefits 
for those in the union sector relative to observationally equivalent non-union workers in the 
form of pay, pensions and off-the-job training.  In the main, these effects are apparent in 
the whole economy and the private sector and existed in both 2011 and 2004.  The effects 
are sometimes absent where unions are organisationally weak.  Whereas the union wage 
premium translates into greater satisfaction with pay this is not the case when it comes to 
off-the-job training. 
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Section 5 
What do unions deliver for employers?  
Introduction 
Reading much of the literature on trade unions one might be forgiven for thinking that they 
are solely focused on their members' interests.  In fact, partly because Britain has a largely 
voluntarist employment relations framework, they are heavily reliant on employers' good 
will to gain access to the workplace and its union members.  Furthermore, even when 
unions are focusing on their members' interests, there can be positive spill-overs to 
employers because union bargaining can help to arrive at efficient outcomes. In addition, 
by aggregating worker preferences and communicating them with a single voice to the 
employer, the union can save an employer the time and money involved in setting up 
alternative voice arrangements. Finally, the union can also perform what might be termed 
an agency role for employers, intervening in disputes and providing a disciplining and 
monitoring role over their members.  
Below we present new evidence on the effects of unions at the workplace, ranging across 
10 dimensions, namely: 
 workplace performance, including financial performance, labour productivity, quality of 
product/service, and an additive scale combining all three  
 workplace closure 
 innovations, including product and service innovation 
 fringe benefits 
 off-the-job training  
 absenteeism 
 injury rates 
 illness rates  
 voluntary quits 
 the climate of employment relations. 
Workplace performance and workplace closure 
Early studies using WERS and other data suggested unionisation adversely affected 
workplace performance but, as discussed in Bryson and Forth (2016), these adverse effects 
dissipated in the 1990s and early 2000s.  We revisit the issue using the three measures of 
managerial perceptions of workplace performance contained in WERS 2004 and 2011.  
The managerial respondents to the survey were asked: ‘Compared with other workplaces in 
the same industry how would you assess your workplace's...financial performance; labour 
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productivity; quality of service or product?’.   For each of these three items, the managerial 
respondent chose one of five responses presented to them on a show card ranging from ‘a 
lot better than average’ to ‘a lot below average’. On each of the three items, the percentage 
of managers saying their workplace performance was ‘a lot below average’ was very small, 
so these responses were combined with those saying ‘below average’ to form a four-point 
scale (1,4). The three subjective workplace performance measures are positively and 
significantly correlated, such that those scoring high (low) on one indicator tended to score 
high (low) on the other two; thus, although distinct, these three measures may relate to a 
single underlying workplace performance scale. We therefore constructed an additive scale 
from three performance items, summing the items then subtracting 3, such that the scale 
ran from 0 (‘below average’ performance on all three items) to 9 (performance ‘a lot better 
than average’ on all 3 items).  
We present results for labour productivity, quality of product/service, financial performance 
and the additive scale combining responses to all three in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 
respectively. 
See tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 in appendix B.  
None of the four unionisation measures are significantly linked to labour productivity, either in 
2004 or 2011, having accounted for observable differences between unionised and non‐
unionised workplaces (Table 5.1).  This is the case for the whole economy and the private 
sector.  The only exception is the negative association with union recognition where there is an 
on‐site union rep in 2004, an effect that is no longer apparent in 2011.  
The picture is similar in relation to the quality of product/service.  Across the whole 
economy none of the union measures are significantly associated with quality of 
product/service in either year (Table 5.2).  In the private sector there are indications of a 
negative association with union recognition, especially in the absence of an on-site union 
representative, in 2004, but again these are no longer significant by 2011. 
With no evidence of a clear union effect on productivity, coupled with a clear positive union 
effect on labour costs through the wage premium and pension provision, it is possible that 
unions might have an adverse effect on workplace financial performance.  There is no 
evidence for this in the whole economy and, in the private sector, while union recognition 
was negatively associated with financial performance in 2004, this effect had disappeared 
by 2011 (Table 5.3). 
If one accepts that these three measures of performance - labour productivity, quality of 
output/service, and financial performance - all relate to an underlying latent performance 
measure, and that each is captured with some measurement error by the individual 
measures, one might get a clearer picture of the links between unionisation and workplace 
performance using the additive scale.  Across the whole economy workplaces recognising 
unions performed more poorly than observationally similar non-unionised workplaces in 
2004, but this was no longer the case in 2011 (Table 5.4, row 1).  In the private sector 
unionised workplaces with on-site union representation were performing more poorly than 
"like" non-unionised workplaces in 2004 but, again, the effect was absent by 2011. 
We use the panel component to the 2004-2011 WERS to establish whether unionisation in 
2004 affected the probability of workplace closure in 2011, conditional on characteristics of 
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the workplace in 2004 as captured by the same set of control variables as appear in the rest 
of the analyses presented here.  We find union recognition increases the probability of 
closure by about 10 percentage points in the whole economy and the private sector, but 
the effect is only on the margins of statistical significance and is not apparent using other 
unionisation measures. 
Taken together these results confirm earlier research in showing that any negative 
association between unionisation, variously defined, and workplace performance which 
might have been apparent in the past, was no longer evident by 2011. 
Innovation 
As in the case of workplace performance, there has been a recent reappraisal of the links 
between unionisation and innovation in Britain.  The earlier literature finding negative 
associations between unionisation and innovation has been challenged with new findings 
suggesting that in the private sector there is a positive link between unionisation and 
product innovation and a non-significant association with process innovation (Bryson et al., 
2016). We investigate this issue with analyses for 2004 and 2011.   
Our innovation measures are based on managerial responses to the following question: 
“Over the past two years has management here introduced any of the changes listed on 
this card? PROBE: Which others? UNTIL 'None':  
 
1) Introduction of performance related pay  
2) Introduction or upgrading of new technology (including computers) 
3) Changes in working time arrangements  
4) Changes in the organisation of work  
5) Changes in work techniques or procedures  
6) Introduction of initiatives to involve employees  
7) Introduction of technologically new or significantly improved product or service  
8) NONE of these” 
 
We construct: an additive scale running from zero to seven based on these items; a 
measure of process innovation based on new production technology (a dummy taking the 
value of 1), which is defined directly from item 2 above; and a measure of product 
innovation identifying new or significantly improved products or services based on item 7.  
Similar questions were asked in 2004 and 2011, the only difference being that, in 2004, item 
2 above was split into two items, namely "introduction or upgrading of computers" and 
"introduction or upgrading of other types of new technology".  We therefore run analyses 
which combine the two and additional analyses which drop the item "introduction or 
upgrading of computers" from the 2004 innovation measure.  Results using both measures 
are similar: the results we present here exclude the additional computer item in 2004. 
See table 5.5 in appendix B. 
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Table 5.5 presents the associations between unionisation and the count measure of 
innovations. In the whole economy the raw correlations between unionisation and 
innovation are positive and statistically significant, but these generally become non-
significant when controlling for observable differences between unionised and non-
unionised workplaces. Union density remains negatively associated with the innovation 
count in 2004 but it is not significant in 2011.  Indeed, the only statistically significant effect 
apparent in 2011 once controls are added is the positive association between recognition 
with on-site union representation and innovation, though the effect is only apparent in the 
‘whole economy’ analysis and is weakly statistically significant at a 90 per cent confidence 
level.  In the private sector union recognition becomes positively statistically significant in 
2011 but, again, only at a 90 per cent confidence level. 
See table 5.6 in appendix B.  
Focusing in on product or service innovation, Table 5.6 finds no evidence of a significant 
ceteris paribus union effect in the whole economy, but there is a positive association 
between union recognition and product innovation in 2011 which appears to be driven by 
unionised workplaces without on-site union representation.  The association holds when 
controlling for observable differences between union and non-union workplaces, but the 
association is only statistically significant at a 90 per cent confidence level. 
See table 5.7 in appendix B.  
Union associations with technological process innovation are largely absent after 
controlling for observable differences across workplaces, although there does appear to be 
a positive association between process innovation and workplaces with minority union 
membership, both in the whole economy and the private sector. 
Fringe benefits 
In Section Four, the employee-level analyses indicated that unionisation continues to be 
associated with pay and non-pay benefits for employees.  A similar finding emerges based 
on analyses of the fringe benefits that managerial respondents say their core non-
managerial employees receive.  We construct a five point additive scale based on 
managerial responses to the following question: "Looking at this card, are [employees in 
the largest non-managerial occupational group] entitled to any of these non-pay terms and 
conditions....employer contributions to a pension scheme; company vehicle or vehicle 
allowance; private health insurance; more than 28 days of paid annual leave (including 
public holidays); sick pay in excess of statutory requirements?" 
See table 5.8 in appendix B.  
In workplaces across the whole economy the fringe benefits score is higher in unionised 
workplaces compared with observationally equivalent non-unionised workplaces (Table 
5.8).  The union effect rises with union density and with the union strength index.  
Furthermore, the union effect has grown between 2004 and 2011.  For instance, in 2004 
workplaces with a recognised union scored 0.45 points higher on the 0–5 scale than similar 
non-union workplaces, but by 2011 the differential had grown to 0.55 points (row 1, whole 
economy).  A similar picture emerges for the private sector, with union effects larger where 
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density is higher and union representatives are present.  The coefficient on the union 
strength index almost doubles between 2004 and 2011. 
Off-the-job training 
Are the positive associations between unionisation and off-the-job training incidence 
identified among employees replicated when investigating the same issue using 
information provided by managerial respondents? We address this issue using responses to 
two questions asked of HR managers.  First "What proportion of experienced [largest non-
managerial occupation] have been given time off from their normal daily work duties to 
undertake training over the past 12 months?"  Response codes are ordinal ranging across 
seven categories from none though to 100 percent.  We recode the responses into a (0,7) 
scale where 7 corresponds to 100 percent.  
In the whole economy, higher percentages of core non-managerial employees received off-
the-job training in unionised workplaces than in observationally equivalent non-union 
workplaces in 2004 (Table 5.9).  The effect was apparent regardless of whether the union 
had an on-site union representative.  By 2011 the union recognition effect was not 
significant and neither was the presence of an on-site union representative.  However, 
union density remained positively associated with the proportion of core non-managerial 
employees receiving training.  Furthermore, the positive association with the union strength 
measure was statistically significant in both 2004 and 2011.   
In the private sector the average effect of unionisation, captured in union recognition, 
became non-significant by 2011 but both union density and the presence of an on-site 
union representative were strongly and statistically significantly linked to greater access to 
off-the-job training.  The union strength index was positively significantly linked to greater 
off-the-job training in both years. 
See table 5.9 in appendix B.  
Managers were also asked "On average, how many days of training did experienced 
[employees in the largest non-managerial occupational group] undertake over the last 12 
months with responses?" with ordinal responses ranging between "None" (code 1) and "10 
days or more" (code 6).  The results, presented in Table 5.10, indicate no association 
between unionisation and the duration of training, either in the whole economy or the 
private sector in either year, once control variables are introduced. 
See table 5.10 in appendix B.  
Absenteeism 
As noted in the literature review, there is surprisingly little evidence on the associations 
between unionisation and absenteeism. From a theoretical perspective union effects are 
ambiguous. Where workers feel protected from arbitrary dismissal by unions they may be 
prepared to take absence when ill, thus reducing 'presenteeism'.  This insurance effect may 
also encourage shirkers to take time off to which they are not entitled. Conversely, if unions 
help improve working conditions through bargaining or voicing worker concerns this may 
reduce the causes of absence. 
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Managers are asked "Over the last 12 months what percentage of work days was lost 
through employee sickness or absence at this workplace? Please exclude authorised leave 
of absence, employees away on secondment or courses or days lost through industrial 
action".  Although there is a positive raw correlation between absence rates and various 
union measures these are no longer apparent when controlling for observable differences 
between union and non-union workplaces (Table 5.11). 
See table 5.11 in appendix B.  
Injury and illness rates 
Managerial respondents are asked to look at a card identifying seven specific types of injury 
and a catch all "any other injury leading to unconsciousness or requiring resuscitation or 
admittance to hospital for more than 24 hours".  If there are any injuries they are then 
asked "During the last 12 months how many employees in all have sustained any of these 
types of injury?"  We express this as a percentage of all employees at the workplace.  Injury 
rates are not associated with unionisation in either 2004 or 2011, a finding that holds for 
the whole economy and the private sector (Table 5.12). 
See 5.12 in appendix B.  
Managers are then asked "In the last 12 months, have any employees suffered from any of 
the following illnesses, disabilities or other physical problems that were caused or made 
worse by their work?"  The card they are asked to look at identifies eight different 
categories. If they identify any they are then asked "how many employees have been absent 
owning to these problems over the last 12 months?"  We express this as a percentage of 
employees at the workplace.  There is some evidence of a positive association between 
unionisation and higher illness rates in 2004 for the whole economy, though the effects are 
only statistically significant at a 90 per cent confidence interval (Table 5.13). Furthermore, 
the association is not apparent by 2011.  Union effects are not apparent in the private 
sector in either year.   
See table 5.13 in appendix B.  
Voluntary quit rates 
One of the most common findings in the literature is that unionisation reduces the 
likelihood that employees will quit the workplace voluntarily.  The finding may be due to 
unions' ability to voice and solve problems employees have at work, or reflect the wage and 
non-wage benefits associated with union jobs which may be denied to them in the non-
union sector. Managers are asked how many full-time and part-time employees were on 
the payroll 12 months previously and "how many of these employees stopped working here 
because they left or resigned voluntarily?"  We use this information to produce a quit rate 
per 100 employees for the workplace. 
See table 5.14 in appendix B.  
In the whole economy union recognition continues to be associated with lower quit rates, 
though the effect diminished between 2004 and 2011 (Table 5.14, row 1).  In 2011 the effect 
is confined to workplaces with an on-site union representative.  The same is true in the 
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private sector.  So there appears to be a diminution in unions' ability to prevent voluntary 
quits over the period. 
The climate of employment relations 
Managers are asked "how would you rate the relationship between management and 
employees generally at this workplace?” responding on an ordinal 5-point scale from "very 
poor" to "very good". We recode responses combining "very poor" and "poor" because few 
managers give a "very poor" rating so the scale runs from 1 (poor/very poor) to 4 (very 
good). 
 
See table 5.15 in appendix B.  
Despite the positive association between unionisation and industrial action in a small 
percentage of workplaces, as discussed in the literature review, none of the union measures 
are associated with the general climate of employment relations in 2004 or 2011, in either 
the whole economy or private sector, once we have accounted for differences in the 
observed characteristics of workplaces in the union and non-union sectors. 
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Section 6 
Summary 
Union incidence and organisation 
There has been a decline in the incidence of union membership and union recognition in 
Britain in the last few decades. This has taken place in both the private and the public 
sectors, though the public sector remains much more heavily unionised.  The rate of decline 
has not been uniform everywhere, but there are few industries or occupations which have 
seen growth in union presence.  In the last decade or so, the rate of decline has slowed 
somewhat. 
Employee benefits 
Compared to observationally similar employees in the non-union sector, those employees 
in a unionised setting receive a wage premium, one that in larger where union density is 
higher and where there is an on-site union representative.  Unionised workers are more 
satisfied with their pay than their non-union comparators.  The benefits of unionisation 
extend to other terms and conditions, such as occupational pensions, and a greater 
likelihood of receiving on-the-job training.  However, the training benefits do not translate 
into greater satisfaction with the training they receive. 
Employer benefits 
In general, unionisation is not associated with employer-related outcomes. Unionisation is 
not associated with workplace performance – whether measured in terms of financial 
performance, labour productivity, the quality of service or output – and is not linked to 
absence, injury or illness rates at work.  The climate of employment relations is no different 
in unionised workplaces than it is in similar non-unionised workplaces.  The chief exception 
to this picture is the strong association between unionisation and lower employee quit 
rates. 
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Section 8 
Appendix A: Summary of the literature 
review 
Introduction 
This appendix summarises the main findings of a literature review assessing the current 
research evidence on the economic impact of workplace union representation. the review 
focused on quantitative studies that had been conducted on good quality, nationally 
representative samples of British workplaces or employees, and relied where possible on 
results from multivariate statistical analyses which controlled for observable differences 
between union and non-union workplaces or employees. It utilised evidence from 
qualitative case studies where this served to fill in gaps in the quantitative literature. 
It can be noted at the outset that the existing literature contains no robust and 
comprehensive evaluation of the net benefits from workplace representation. However our 
summary of the evidence (below) suggested that there is a good, prima facie case for 
supporting workplace union representation. One way in which employers may do this is 
through the provision of facility time.  
What is the evidence on the provision of facility time? 
Some 24 per cent of private sector employees work at a workplace where there are lay 
representatives from a recognised trade union; the equivalent figure in the public sector is 
72 per cent. These figures have been stable over the past decade. Lead representatives in 
private sector workplaces spend an average of 11 hours per week (paid or unpaid) on their 
representative duties, whilst those in the public sector spend an average of 15 hours per 
week. However, this difference is not statistically significant and is mostly accounted for by 
the larger number of union members in public sector workplaces. Lead reps in the public 
sector are less likely than reps in the private sector to be paid by their employer for 
engaging in union duties, but the facilities provided to workplace union representatives in 
the two sectors are broadly similar.  
Unions’ impact on pay 
Historically, one of the principal benefits for union members in Britain has been the delivery 
of a wage premium over similar non-members through collective bargaining. The recent 
evidence indicates that union members in Britain earn around 5 per cent more than 
equivalent non-members on average; the premium is, however, slightly higher in the public 
sector than in the private sector. Because unions help to raise the wages of the lowest paid 
and also encourage the use of more objective criteria in pay setting, wages in unionised 
jobs are also less widely dispersed; unions have thus historically helped to limit wage 
inequality. 
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Unions’ impact on employment and hours 
If unions raise employees’ wages, one may expect negative effects on employment levels 
and thus job security. However if unions merely raise wages to the level of employees’ 
productivity, or improve levels of workplace efficiency, the effects on employment may be 
zero or even positive. The research evidence in the 1980s and 1990s indicated that 
unionised plants in the private and public sectors grew more slowly than non-union plants, 
and that redundancies were more likely. However, the recent evidence on employment 
growth (available only for the private sector) shows no differences between union and non-
union workplaces. Moreover, unionised workplaces are more likely to have job-security 
provisions, which imply that redundancies are more likely to be arrived at voluntarily when 
they do occur.  
Research into unions’ effects in limiting long-hours working is surprisingly limited, but 
quantitative research does indicate that unionised employees work fewer hours of unpaid 
overtime. Union members also enjoy longer paid holiday entitlements. 
Unions’ impact on the provision of fringe benefits 
Research into the impact of unions on the provision of extra-statutory fringe benefits is less 
extensive than research into union wage effects, and is also a little dated. However, the few 
studies which have been conducted are consistent in showing that workplaces with 
recognised unions are more likely to provide extra-statutory sick pay, employer-provided 
pensions, special paid leave for emergencies and subsidized childcare.  
Unions’ impact on skills and training 
Union Learning Reps (ULRs) positively influence training levels in a significant proportion of 
cases, with those effects most likely where ULRs spent a substantial amount of time on their 
role; were supported by a workplace Learning Centre or Union Learning Fund, were valued 
by managers, and were able to consult or negotiate over training. Although less positive 
than ULRs themselves, a significant proportion of managers nevertheless say ULRs have a 
positive effect on training. The most recent study using WERS 2011 finds private sector 
employees' likelihood of receiving off-the-job training was significantly higher if the 
workplace has an on-site union representative compared to a like individual in a like 
workplace without an on-site union representative.  
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Unions’ impact on the work/life balance arrangements 
Evidence from the late 1990s showed unionised workplaces to have higher levels of 
provision of family-friendly practices – notably parental leave, paid family leave, child-care 
and job sharing – compared with “like” workplaces without unions. Provision of parental 
and paid family leave rose with union density, suggesting their presence reflects union 
bargaining power. Unions also increased employee awareness of such practices through 
information provision, thus facilitating their use. However, the options to work at home or 
have flexible working hours were less common in a union setting. Further work is required 
to up-date these analyses in the light of changes in legislation. 
Unions’ impact on dispute resolution 
It has long been argued that union representatives can serve as ‘lubricants’ in the 
workplace, facilitating the informal (and formal) resolution of grievances and disciplinary 
matters. Recent case studies continue to support this proposition, but emphasise that 
unions’ effectiveness in dispute resolution is contingent on the presence of strong and 
skilled union representation and trusting relationships with managers. Quantitative 
research, for its part, has shown that disciplinary procedures are more systematic in 
workplaces with recognised unions, and that dismissals and disciplinary sanctions are less 
common where union membership density is higher.  
Unions’ impact on equal opportunities 
Union representation and collective bargaining provides one means of promoting equality 
of opportunity within a firm or workplace through the formulation of centralised standards 
and procedures for monitoring and evaluation. Quantitative research has shown that 
workplaces in which unions negotiate, or are consulted, over equal opportunities (EO) 
issues are more likely to have EO practices in place. Furthermore, small-scale surveys of 
trade union equality reps and disability champions indicate that their impact on employers’ 
equality practices is greater when such issues are subject to negotiation; their impact also 
rises with the amount of time spent on the role.  
Unions’ impact on health, safety and sickness absence 
A new study finds union density is positively associated with managerial perceptions of the 
health and safety risks faced by employees, but union density is not associated with worker 
control over those risks, suggesting a limited ability for unions to mitigate those risks. 
However, having on-site worker representatives dealing with health and safety is associated 
with workers being exposed to lower health and safety risks than workers who rely on direct 
consultation between management and employees to deal with health and safety matters. 
Early studies for Britain found either positive or no significant union effects on workplace 
absence rates but there is no recent evidence on this issue. 
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Unions’ impact on worker wellbeing 
Studies often show that unionised workers have lower levels of job satisfaction than non-
union workers but, once differences between union and non-union workers are fully 
accounted for, switching into union coverage is associated with higher satisfaction with pay 
and hours of work. Recent research also indicates that the job-related anxiety that 
accompanies organisational change at work is ameliorated when employees work in a 
unionized workplace and are involved in the introduction of the changes. 
Unions’ impact on labour turnover 
Unions are capable of relaying and helping to resolve concerns employees have at work, 
resulting in them staying longer than they might have done in the absence of unionisation. 
This is the essence of “union voice”. However, the most recent evidence suggests the effect 
is confined to workplaces with a union representative on-site, raising questions about the 
effectiveness of union recognition in the absence of a representative. Non-union forms of 
voice generally have no effects on voluntary labour turnover but, in one study, have a 
positive impact. 
Unions’ impact on innovation and the management of 
change 
Evidence in the 1980s suggested union bargaining over job demarcations were a brake on 
labour reorganisation, while unions’ ability to bargain over the additional surplus created by 
capital investment discouraged product and process innovation. This has since changed. 
Many of the craft-based and other job demarcations began to disappear in the 1980s, 
sometimes with unions winning wage concessions in return. This created the pre-conditions 
for more flexible working, such as the team working and functional flexibility, such that 
these high-involvement practices are more likely to be found in union than non-union 
workplaces today. Workplace and firm-level bargaining in Britain is now positively 
associated with product innovation. It is also positively associated with the introduction of 
new technology but not statistically significantly. It seems that early empirical studies 
suggesting unions may be detrimental to innovation thus offer a misleading picture of 
union effects today. 
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Unions’ impact on productivity and profitability 
There are a multitude of channels by which unions could, in theory, affect productivity, 
whether measured in terms of sales per employee, value-added, or their quality-adjusted 
equivalents. The literature has tended to assume that unions' "voice" face can be pro-
productive. For instance, it may improve the quality of information managers use to make 
their decisions. Equally, it is assumed that unions' "monopoly" face used to bargain for 
higher wages could be detrimental to firm performance, at least measured in terms of 
profitability. However, union bargaining over higher wages can also be positive for firm 
productivity since, other things equal, higher wage levels can attract and retain more 
productive workers, as well as motivating them to work harder. Furthermore, by creating 
conditions in which workers are less likely to quit, unions may create the conditions for 
higher employer investments in human capital, which should also lead to higher 
productivity. 
Despite the ambiguity regarding the theoretical effects of unions on productivity and 
profitability the empirical literature is quite clear. The negative association between 
unionisation and workplace performance and productivity identified in the 1980s 
disappeared by the 1990s. This remains the case. The disappearance of the gap is due to an 
improvement in the relative position of unionised workplaces rather than any deterioration 
among non-unionised workplaces. 
The impact of unions in the aftermath of recession 
Although the recession had a profound impact on workers and firms through falling real 
wages and labour productivity, the impact of recession appears to have been similar, for the 
most part, in the union and non-union sectors, although the more unionised public sector 
did suffer greater job losses and workers in the public sector experienced greater job 
insecurity than those in the private sector. There were, however, two areas in which 
economic effects differed between the union and non-union sectors. First, private sector 
unionised workplaces were more likely to close between 2004 and 2011 than similar non-
union workplaces. Second, there is some evidence of greater labour intensification in the 
union sector compared to the non-union sector. 
Conclusions 
Our review has summarised the current research evidence on the micro-economic impact of 
workplace union representation, covering a wide range of issues of interest to workers and 
employers. Such a review provides a useful reference point for discussions around the Trade 
Union Bill, which would inevitably place some additional restrictions on union activity in the 
UK. More broadly, however, reviews such as this also provide potentially useful reference 
points for employees - for whom the economic returns to union membership are a key 
factor in deciding whether to join (Charlwood, 2002) – and for employers who are largely 
free to decide whether to encourage or discourage union organisation within the UK’s 
largely-voluntarist system of collective employment relations. 
We find that unions still deliver observable benefits to the average union member, in terms 
of higher wages, more extensive fringe benefits, higher levels of workplace training and the 
 29 
more effective resolution of individual workplace disputes. At the same time, the negative 
effects on employers, once a common feature of empirical studies, have largely dissipated 
in recent years. 
There are two important caveats to this conclusion, however. First, it is clear that union 
effects are heterogeneous, and that a number of the observed effects are confined to 
workplaces with on-site representatives or high membership density. This contributes to 
heterogeneity of experience across sectors and types of worker. Second, we focus on the 
private returns to workers and firms.  Unions also have broader potential impacts on 
society, such as their role in promoting democracy (see, for example Bryson et al., 2014), 
which are not touched on here.  
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Table 3.1: Union membership and organisation in Britain, 2004 and 2011 
 
Part A: Workplaces 
Cell percentages 
 Private sector Whole economy 
 2004 2011 2004 2011 
     
Workplace has recognised unions 13 12 22 22 
     
Workplace union density:     
Zero 81 86 73 78 
1-49% 12 11 14 13 
50-100% 6 3 13 10 
     
Workplace union rep:     
No recognition 87 88 78 78 
Recognition without on-site rep 9 9 15 15 
Recognition + on-site rep 4 3 7 7 
     
PT/FT rep of recognised union:     
No on-site rep of recognised union 96 97 93 93 
Part-time rep 4 3 7 6 
Full-time rep 0 0 1 1 
     
Hours on union duties:     
No on-site rep of recognised union 96 97 93 93 
Hours missing 1 1 1 2 
0-4 hours 2 2 4 3 
5-14 hours 1 0 1 1 
15+ hours 0 0 1 1 
     
Union strength index (range 0-6):     
Mean  0.38 0.25 0.72 0.57 
Median 0 0 0 0 
75th percentile 0 0 0 0 
     
Number of observations (minimum) 1,660 1,801 2,203 2,522 
Source: WERS Survey of Managers 
Base: Workplaces with 5 or more employees 
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Table 3.1 Part B: Employees 
Cell percentages 
 Private sector Whole economy 
 2004 2011 2004 2011 
     
Union member 20 19 31 30 
     
Workplace has recognised unions 32 35 48 51 
      
Workplace union density:     
Zero 57 60 44 47 
1-49% 28 27 29 30 
50-100% 15 13 27 24 
     
Workplace union rep:     
No recognition 68 65 52 49 
Recognition without on-site rep 8 7 11 11 
Recognition + on-site rep 24 28 36 40 
     
PT/FT rep of recognised union:     
No on-site rep of recognised union 77 73 65 62 
Part-time rep 18 20 25 28 
Full-time rep 6 7 11 11 
     
Hours on union duties:     
No on-site rep of recognised union 76 72 64 60 
Hours missing 2 5 3 7 
0-4 hours 8 9 10 11 
5-14 hours 6 4 9 7 
15+ hours 8 11 14 15 
     
Union strength index (range 0-6):     
Mean  1.04 1.03 1.65 1.58 
Median 0 0 0 0 
75th percentile 2 2 3 3 
      
Number of observations (minimum) 14,803 13,094 21,491 20,481 
Source: WERS Survey of Employees 
Base: Employees in workplaces with 5 or more employees 
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Table 3.1 Part C: Number of workplace observations (unweighted) 
 
 Private sector Whole economy 
 2004 2011 2004 2011 
     
Workplace has recognised unions     
Yes 1,097 1,272 1,133 1,313 
No 545 538 1,093 1,308 
     
Workplace union density:     
Zero 948 1,158 968 1,183 
1-49% 459 447 643 724 
50-100% 253 200 592 626 
     
Workplace union rep:     
No recognition 1,097 1,272 1,133 1,313 
Recognition without on-site rep 163 149 324 358 
Recognition + on-site rep 382 389 769 950 
     
PT/FT rep of recognised union:     
No on-site rep of recognised union 1,324 1,471 1,527 1,732 
Part-time rep 304 299 563 690 
Full-time rep 77 84 203 245 
     
Hours on union duties:     
No on-site rep of recognised union 1,260 1,421 1,457 1,671 
Hours missing 84 117 140 271 
0-4 hours 112 102 211 236 
5-14 hours 84 75 163 171 
15+ hours 102 95 255 272 
     
Union strength index (range 0-6):     
Index observed 1,660 1,801 2,203 2,522 
      
Source: WERS Survey of Managers 
Base: Workplaces with 5 or more employees 
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